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Network Effects In Two-Sided Electronic Market: A Cross-Country Empirical
Analysis Of Online P2P Lending Market
JiaXianQiu, Chengdu University of Information and Technology, China, qiujiaxian@aliyun.com
ABSTRACT
With a two-sided model, this paper reports an empirical research investigating online Peer-to-Peer lending marketplaces,
PPDai.com in China and Prosper.com in US. We observe that the platform’s profit-maximizing pricing strategies for the agents in
the online P2P lending marketplaces are mainly related to the network effects between and within the two sides. Agents’
inter-group and intra-group network externalities depend on the demand-supply relationships, which is unlike the assumptions of
negative intra-group network externalities and positive inter-group network externalities in the previous theoretical research of
electronic commerce. Besides, as assumed in the theoretical model, it demonstrates significant negative price elasticity of
demand and supply on both platforms. Based on the theoretical model and empirical results, we analyze the two platforms’
profit-maximizing pricing strategies, and explain the rationality and deficiency of the strategies. The findings enhance our
understanding of the two-sided electronic market, which could shed light on how the platforms make price strategies in this kind
of electronic market.
Keywords: two-sided market, pricing strategy, network externalities, online Peer-to-Peer lending
INSTRUCTIONS
Background
The development of new technologies for information and communication has brought informational intermediation to the
forefront of the “new economy” [1]. Different forms of new industries have emerged and been growing rapidly in last two
decades, and many of these industries have appeared to match the context of “two-sided market”(see summarized examples of
two-sided market by Evans [2]). In these markets, intermediaries or “platforms” enable interactions among distinct groups of
agents and attempt to gain the two sides with rational price to each side [3], where each side derives network externalities from
the participation of members on the other side. Rochet and Tirole[4] strictly define a two-sided market as one in which the
volume of transactions between end-users depends on the structure and not only on the overall level of the fees charged by the
platform.
As a main part of “new economy”, electronic commerce has been growing rapidly for twodecades and penetrated almost all
industries [5], as well as creating new industries such as online auction houses and digital marketplaces [6]. Many online
marketplaces show characteristics whereby two groups of agents – the buyers and the sellers – come together and interact with
one another via the enabling marketplace [7]. Bakos[8] describes two functions that are provided by electronic marketplaces: (1)
matching buyers and sellers; and (2) facilitation of transactions. According to the emerging theory of two-sided markets, a
significant number of fast developing electronic marketplaces (i.e., eBay, Taobao, Tmall, Amazon and 360Buy) can be
characterized as two-sided market. During last two decades, many electronic marketplaces continue to flourish, and are
generating enormous volumes of trades [3]. For example, Tmall, the largest online B2C marketplace in the world, has more than
400 million members and its maximum daily transaction value is about ¥ 91.22 billion right in 2015; eBay has about 164 million
active global users and the total value of transactions in 2015 was more than82.0 billion US dollars. However, during this fast
developing process, most of electronic marketplace providers have been bothered by the profitability problem. In order to attract
users, many electronic platforms are free for the users, and sometimes even subsidize the consumers in the form of sales
promotion. Under this situation, some famous commercial websites, such as Commerce One had gone into bankruptcy.
Furthermore, although much of the electronic commercial in its early years focused on online selling (e-commerce), a wider
variety of e-business initiatives (collectively described as e-business) have emerged in recent years [9], such as online lending,
online social networks and online media. These new kinds of electronic marketplaces have different business models and pricing
strategies from the electronic selling. When the diverse nature and magnitude of the possible interactions in the new electronic
markets present challenges to the industries as well as the scholars [7], more new opportunities are also offered. Despite the
differences among different types of electronic marketplaces, they usually face the same challenging issues: What kind of
network externalities users have in the marketplace? what kinds of factors will affect user network externality? how do user
network externalities affect the platform’s profit-maximizing pricing strategy? and how to price services for different kinds of
users to maximize the platform’s profit? It is going to be helpful for us to figure out the difference among the different forms of
electronic markets through answering these questions for different kinds of marketplaces, which is useful for the development of
electronic market.
Intend to find some answers of these questions, this study takes a new form of two-sided electronic market, online Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) lending, to conduct empirical study by using the transactional data of Prosper.com in US and PPDai.com in China. Our
objectives are: (1) to quantify user network externalities in the marketplaces; (2) to explore what kind of factors would influence
on the user network externalities; (3) to find the user’s reaction to the platform’s price strategy; and (4) to investigate how
network effects and prices impact on the platform’s profit-maximizing pricing strategies. The rest part of this paper is organized
as follows. In Sect. 2, we review the related literature. The two-sided market model for online P2P lending is built in Sect. 3. Sect.
4 displays the empirical results and the detailed analysis. Finally, we summarize the study in Sect. 5.
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Literature review
Along with the fast development of different types of two-sided markets, there has been a recent surge of interest in two-sided
market platforms [7], and the related literature is accumulatively proliferated [10]. These research outcomes are applicable to
various markets, such as bank card, advertising-supported media, dating agencies, software platforms, telecommunication, and
shopping malls. A considerable research of two-sided market method in electronic commerce has appears in recent years.
To date, the literature on two-sided electronic market has concentrated on different research questions.Katsamakas[11] builds a
two-sided model for an operating system platform to compare industry structures based on a proprietary platform (such as
Windows) with those based on an open source platform (such as Linux), while Hagiu[12] identifies an economic welfare tradeoff
between two-sided open platforms and two-sided closed platforms connecting consumers and producers. According to the
standard two-sided market model of Armstrong [13], Economides andTåg[14] discuss the desirability of departing from network
neutrality to allow residential Internet access providers to initiate a positive fee to the content and applications side of the market,
besides the price it charges to users/subscribers. Lin et al. [15] model the innovation race among sellers in both finite and infinite
horizons to examine a platform’s optimal two-sided pricing strategy. Reisinger[16]analyzes two-part tariffs and Liu and
Serfes[17]focus on the price discrimination.
Moreover, there has been active research on electronic marketplace in the direction of network externalities. Yoo et al. [18],
BakosandKatsamakas[19], Belleflamme and Toulemonde[20], Li et al.[7] and Li et al. [3] analyze the effects of two types of
network externalities on the pricing strategies in an independent intermediary electronic marketplace. Yoo et al. [18] consider the
intra-group network effects and switching costs with regard to the optimal price of a monopolistic B2B marketplace. Close to
Yoo et al. [18], Li et al. [3] extend the quantity of services and theoretically analyze a monopolistic e-marketplace with the
introduction of negative intra-group externalities within members of the two groups. BakosandKatsamakas[19] discuss how the
electronic intermediary to invest in technologies for each side by modelling endogenous network effects. Compare to other
models, Li et al.[7]explicitly model the possibility of both positive and negative cross-group and within-group network effects,
and consider the effect of competition between the sellers as well as the competition between platforms on the price they charge
the buyers.
Although a considerable literature theoretically discusses the network effects and pricing strategies of electronic marketplace,
several empirical challenges exist when attempting to test the theory of two-sided market. Toestimate the theory, the researcher
requires meaningful data on both sides of the market, such asprice and quantity observations, as well as exogenous variation that
will identify parameters of interest thatdrive the equilibrium decisions of platforms[21].As a result of these requirements,
researchers have turnedto payment systems and media, especially for the newspaper and magazine markets, where advertising
and circulation information has been made available, such as German[22], Canadian[23],U.S[21]. In the field of payment
systems,Rysman[24] and Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran[25] estimate the network effects among users.Related empirical studies
concerned with the two-sided characteristics of electronic market are also mainly focusing on estimating usersnetwork effects. In
order to validate the network externality assumed in the theory, Kraemer et al.[6] develop a growth empirical model for the
platform and empirically analyze the network effects on eBay, and Gupta et al.[26]present a model to value the “free” customers
wherein buyer and seller growth arise from marketing actions and direct and indirect network effects by apply the model to an
anonymous auction house’s monthly data. Similar to each other, both Kraemer et al.[6] and Gupta et al.[26]only empirically
analyze network effects in two-sided electronic markets, but do not quantify the interactive effects between price and network
externality. Chu and Manchanda[27] state that previous work often focused onthe benefits (or costs) a user obtains from
additional users from either the same orthe opposite user group, but not simultaneously from both sides. In order to solve the
problem of the requirement of complex data to support the empirical research, Hildebrand[28] develops a semi-structural
approach to identifying network effects on two-sided monopoly platforms without data on prices and quantities.
Early empirical studies of two-sided market, such as Rysman[24], Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran[25],Kraemer et al.[6] and
Gupta et al.[26]–mainly emphasize the network effects among users and how important it is to take the view that these markets
are two-sided markets.Unlike these studies, this researchuses the transaction data of online Peer-to-Peer market, not only
empirically estimates the network effects among users in two-sided electronic market, but also analyzes the effects of platform’s
pricing strategies and how network effects and prices impact on the platform’s profit. The research is helpful to understanding the
characteristics of two-sided electronic market as well as makes up for the deficiency of the empirical research.
As a new application of IT technology in the financial industry, online P2P lending market matches people who need loans with
the willing lenders. Without banks as intermediaries, borrowers and lenders in online P2P lending markets could communicate
and trade with each other directly. The loan without any mortgage may cause inherent risk of defaults. In order to solve the
problem of information asymmetry, most of the scholars[i.e., 29, 30, 31] focus on human behaviour in the online P2P lending
market, especially the effects of social network on the loan performance. However, little attention has been paid on the pricing
strategy of online P2P lending market. As a new form of electronic two-sided market, online P2P lending market has the
characteristics, such as wide-range consumers, unlimited time and region, and fast information transmission, that an electronic
market generally has. Besides, it also has some differences from the electronic commerce (online selling) that usually is
discussed in previous research. The emergence of online P2P lending provides us with a good opportunity to fill the gap of
insufficient empirical analysis of the electronic market, especially the new form ones. With the daily transaction data of
Prosper.com in US and PPDai.com in China, we empirically analyzing the users’ network externalities and price sensitivities, as
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well as the platforms’ pricing strategies, based on the two-sided market theory. From the implications for practice, this study
enhances our understanding of the electronic markets, which could shed light on how to make pricing strategies for the platforms.
From the implications for research, the empirical findings of this new form of electronic markets also imply the lack of previous
literature, and put forward some new research directions.
The two-sided market model for online P2P lending
Theoretic models of two-sided market
Based on the business model of online P2P lending, we build a monopoly two-sided market model derived from the one built by
Armstrong [13]. Consider there are two groups of homogeneous agents in the market, we assume that the utility of a
representative agent in a group is determined by the inter-group externality, the cost for using the platform and intra-group
network externality [3, 7]. The two-sided agents’ utility models in online P2P lending marketplace is formalized in equation (1).

ui   i n j   i ni   i ir  pi , u j   j ni   j n j   j ir  p j

(1)

In equation (1), ni and n j respectively represent the number of agents in each group; pi and p j are the prices charged by the
platform for the two types of agents. Parameter  i (  j ) measures the benefit or loss that a group- i (group- j ) agent (agent i (j)
hereafter) undertakes via interacting with agents in group-j (group-i ). Parameter  i (  j ) measures the benefit or loss of agent i(j)
who receives from other agents in the same group.
Suppose the numbers of members in each group who join the platform are the functions of the agents’ utility
nx  x (ux ), x  (i, j ) , the platform’s profit model could be expressed as,

  [ pi  fi ]i (ui ) [ pj  f j ]j (u j )

(2)

where fi ( f j ) is the per-agent cost that incurs at the platform in group i (j).The platform’s profit function can be rewritten as
equation (3).

  [
(u j )  ii (ui )  ui  fi ]i (ui )  [ ji (ui )   j j (u j )  u j  f j ] j (u j )
i j

(3)

Let  i be the price elasticity of agent i, i  pii' i , then the platform’s profit-maximizing price pi should satisfy

pi 

i
( j j  ii  fi ) . The platform’s profit-maximizing price is determined by the cost of services, inter- and intra1  i

group network externalities, and the agent’s price elasticity. Assume the agent’s price elasticity is negative, the relationship of
agent’s network effect and platform’s costs determines the platform’s pricing strategies. When the agent i ’s network effects
(  j j  ii ) are greater than the variable cost ( f i ), the platform should subsidize the agent. However, if the platform’s variable
cost ( f i ) is greater than the agent’s network effects (  j j  ii ), the platform could charge positive fee and take profit from the
agent. On the other hand, given the value of agent i ’s network effects (  j j  ii ), the platform should charge or subsidize
more (less) when the agent has higher (lower) price elasticity (i ). The relationships among platform’s profit-maximizing price,
agent’s network effects, and price elasticity are shown in Fig. 1.
Price

p
 j j   ii  fi  0
pi
0



i



Price
Elasticity

 pi

 j j   ii  f i  0

Figure 1: The relationship among profit-maximizing price, the agent’ network effect and price elasticity
Online P2P lending market
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Online P2P lending market has achieved a great success since Zopa at UK, the earliest online P2P lending marketplace, was
launched in 2005. Harvard Business Review announced it to be one of the 20 breakthrough ideas for 2009 [32]. Generally
speaking, there are two kinds of online P2P lending marketplaces, profit marketplace (such as Prosper and PPDai) and non-profit
marketplace (such as Kiva and Wokai). In this study, online P2P lending market refers to the profit market. In a profit-oriented
online P2P lending marketplace, the platform helps borrowers and lenders complete the transactions, and charges them fees. In
general, the business model of online P2P lending is displayed in Fig. 2.

Figure2: Business model of online P2P lending
Usually,there are several steps in the transactions process in online P2P lending market. First, borrowers and lenders should
register on the platform by providing the needed personal information to the platform. Second, if a borrower wants to borrow
money, she/he could create and publish a loan requested listing. The listing should include the listing information (e.g., amount of
money needed, the maximum interest rate, loan period, and loan purpose) and borrower’s personal information (e.g., gender, job,
and income). The third step is bidding process. During the period the listing published in the marketplace, it could be viewed and
bid by lenders. The listing can be bid by more than one lender. The borrower could obtain the loan if listing is fully funded. After
the listing is funded, the platform will deposit the funds to the borrower and make sure the listing becomes a loan. In this step, the
platform charges transaction fees for both borrower and lender. The last step is the repayment of the loan. According to the
agreement, the borrower repay the principals as well as interests of the loan to the lenders.
The empirical model
(1) The utility models of two-sided users
In online P2P lending market, a necessary condition for a borrower to obtain loan is that lenders’ total bid amount (Supply) is
equal to or greater than the borrower’s requested loan amount (Demand) during auction time. When the total bid amount is
greater than the borrower’s demand amount in a listing, the bidders with lower bidding interest rate finally fund the loan.
Borrowers’ demand usually could not be satisfied because of the insufficient supply amount, and lenders could not always lend
money to the borrowers because of the failed listings or failed bid with higher bidding interest rate than other lenders. Then, in the
marketplace, the total transaction amount is usually smaller than total supply amount and total demand amount. For each period
t, we could have borrowers’ total demand amount ( DAMT ), lenders’ total supply amount ( SAMTt ), and the total transaction amount
( TAMT ).
t

t

Suppose the borrower could have positive utility in the transaction if and only if the requested listing could be successfully
funded, while the lender could gain the income in the transaction if and only if the bid amount could be successfully lend to
borrowers. So, under the certain conditions during a period in the marketplace, the successful rate of borrowers’ demand and the
successful rate of lenders’ supply could reflect the utilities gained by borrowers and lenders as a whole. The successful rate of
borrowers’ demand in period t is represented by SDt , which is equal to TAMTt DAMTt . The successful rate of lenders’ demand in
period t is represented by

SSt , which

is equal to TAMTt SAMTt .

In the marketplace, whether a borrower could fund the loan or not is determined by the lenders’ supply and the competition with
other borrowers. For a lender, whether he/she could lend money or not is determined by borrowers’demand and the participation
of other lenders.Following the assumptions in the theoretical analysis of two-sided market, user’s utility is directly influenced by
the number of two-sided users as well as the platform’s transaction fees. The total number of lenders and lenders are added into
the empirical models to capture inter- and intra- group network effects, which are respectively represented by TBt and TLt .
However, borrowers of different successful transactions usually have different transaction fees because of different loan amounts,
credit grades and/or loan periods, and lenders have different transaction with each others because of different credit grades,
interest rates and/or bid amount. In this research, we use average transaction fee rates to indicate the level of transaction fee in
each period, which are shown as average borrower transaction fee rate Pbt and average lender transaction fee rate Plt in the
empirical model. Besides, in online P2P lending market, the interest could also directly affect the utilities gained by borrowers
and lenders, respectively. And we add the average interest rate of the listings, which is denoted as IRt in the empirical models.
Furthermore, we consider the control for the effects of total demand amount DAMTt . We get the following empirical
specifications,
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 LnSDt  1 LnTLt  1 LnTBt  1 LnAVBfratet  1 LnAVIRt   1 LnDAMTt  1 ,

 LnSSt   2 LnTBt   2 LnTLt  2 LnAVLfratet   2 LnAVIRt   2 LnDAMTt   2

(4)

where the subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the two groups of agents, and t is date. SDt and SSt are the success rates of demand and
supply on dayt. P bit ( Plit ) represents the average transaction fee rate of borrowers ( lenders), and  1 ( 2 ) means the borrower’s
(lender’s) price elasticity. Besides,  ,  are the coefficients of total numbers of two-group agents, which are used to measure the
inter-group network externality and intra-group network externality;  and  are the coefficients of average interest rate and
total demand amount on day t ;  1 and  2 are the random error terms of two equations.
(2) Platform’s profit function
In two-sided marketplace, platform’s profit is usually affected by the platform’s price strategies, size of users, and network
effects among users[i.e., 3, 13, 33]. About the relationships between platform’s profit and the users’ fee rates, the assumption of
profit-maximizing price indicates the quadratic linear relationship。 So, we build the platform’s profit function is shown as
equation .

Upt  c3   3iTBt   3iTLt   31 AVBfratet   32 AVBfratet2   31 AVLfratet   32 AVLfratet2  3 AVIRt   3

(5)

Empirical analysis
Dataset
The archival data are collected from two major online P2P lending marketplaces, PPDai.com and Prosper.com. PPDai is a
leading online P2P lending marketplace in China, found in August 2007. It provided over 50 million RMB in loan facilitation for
over 600,000 registered users since it had been launched.Prosper was founded in February 2006 in US, which is one of the largest
and earliest online P2P lending marketplace in the world. Right now, it has more than 1.6 million members and over $500
millions in funded loans.
The daily transaction data of PPDai from 18th June 2007 to 15th June 2011 used in this study was provided by the company
directly, while the daily transaction data of Prosper from 16th August 2006 to the present is downloadable from Prosper’s website.
Prosper was shut down by Securities and Exchange Commission during 2008 and 2009 twice because of the legal problem, and
it re-opened on 13th July 2009 till now. Fig. 3 gives the Prosper’s daily total loan amount from 16th August 2006 to 7th March
2011 with discontinuities between year 2008 to 2009.
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Figure 3:Prosper’s daily total loan amount during 2006-08-16 to 2011-03-07
From the Prosper’s daily total transaction amount, we can see that the platform’s transaction was influenced by the events.
Considering the effectiveness of the data analysis, we only use the data before Prosper was shut down by the government in this
study.
Data processing
Usually, mostly transactions in online P2P marketplaces last more than one day, and the data such as the total bid amount, interest
rate bid by lenders are changing over time. In order to simplify the problem, we take a snapshot of a transaction on the day it is
built. There are several reasons. Firstly, borrower sets the attributes of the listing such as demand amount, interest rate, loan
period according to the current situation of market. Second, the attributions of a listing become the most important factors
influence the lenders’ decisions, such as the bid amount and bid interest rate. Third and most important, more and more listings
that successfully fund the loan could complete the transaction on the creation date because the increase of the market.
Some data in empirical model could simply get from the dataset provided by the platforms, such as the total demand amount
( DAMTt ), total transaction/loan amount ( TAMTt ), total supply/bid amount ( SAMTt ), total number of two-sided users ( TBt , TLt ).
However, some data such as platform’s profit ( Pprofitt ), average interest rate ( AVIRt ), average borrower transaction fee rate
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( AVBfratet ) and average lender transaction fee rate ( AVLfratet ) need to pre-processed through the available data.
On both PPDai and Prosper, the platforms charge transaction fees for the two-sided users when the listing is fund successfully,
and we choose the successful listings to count the average transaction fee rates. Take Prosper.com for example, the lenders’
average transaction fee rate on each date is calculated as follow two steps.
First, we get the lenders’ total transaction fees of loan

i according to the Prosper’s rule.

Months

Lfeeti 



(SLoanAmttij  Daystij  Lfrateti / 365)

(6)

j 1

Then, we add all loans’ total lenders’ transaction fees on date t . And by using the total lender transaction fee to be divided by the
total loan amount on the same date, we get the average lender transaction fee rate AVLfratet of the day.
(7)

AVLfratet   Lfeeti /  LoanAmtti  100
i

i

According to the borrower’s price strategies set by Prosper, we calculated the borrowers’ average transaction fee rate as equation
(8)and (9).

Bfeeti  IF  Bfrateti  LoanAmtti  BMfeeti , BMfeeti , Bfrateti  LoanAmtti 

(8)

AVBfratet   Bfeeti /  LoanAmtti 100

(9)

i

i

Form the total transaction fees of two-sided users, could work out the platform’s total income of transaction fees on date t .
(10)

Pprofitt   Bfeeti   Lfeeti
i

i

As shown in the part of online P2P lending’s business model, the interest rate could directly influence on the utility of two-sided
users, which becomes to be an very important factor influencing on the lenders’ decisions. So, we count not only successful but
also failed listings into the calculation of average interest rate on each date, which is shown in equation (11) and (12).

Interestti 

( Damtti  IRti  Monthsti /12)
 Damtti
(1  Power (1  IRti 12,  Monthsti ))

(11)

AVIRt   Interestti /  Damtti  100

(12)

i

i

Empirical results
Under the consideration of the interactions between borrowers and lenders, we estimate the empirical models via simultaneous
equation method. Table 1 and Table 2 present the estimation results based on equation (4), where the dependent variables of the
two models are (the success rate of borrower demand) and (the success rate of lender supply). We use the superscripts and to
separately denote PPDai and Prosper.
PPDai has changed only once for both the borrower transaction fee and lender transaction fee since it was launched. So there is
only one dummy variable of price in each model. Table 1 shows the 3SLS (Three-Stage Least Squares) estimation results of
PPDai.
Table 1: 3SLS estimation results of PPDai( N=1,456)
Borrower

Total number of lenders ( 1pd )
Total number of borrowers ( 1pd )

Coefficient
1.11e  04
2.91e  05

Lender
p-value
<.001 Total number of borrowers (  2pd )
Total number of lenders ( 2pd )
<.001

Coefficient
4.48e  05

p-value
<.001

8.12e  05

<.001
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Borrower fee ( 1pd )

0.004
pd
1

Total demand amount (  )
Time trend ( 1pd )
R

2

R

2

2.48e  08

0.799
<.001

2.10e  04

<0.010

Lender fee ( 2pd )

-0.078
pd
2

Total demand amount (  )
Time trend (  2pd )

0.667
0.667

R

2

R

2

<.050
<.001
<.001

1.70e 07
5.35e  04

0.424
0.422

The estimation result shows that most of the variables’ coefficients are statistically significant under the 1% level, except the two
dummy variables of prices. The coefficient 1pd is not significant at 10% level, while 2pd is significantly negative at 5% level. It
pd

indicates that the borrower’s success demand rate ( SDt ) was not significantly influenced by the adjustment of borrower
pd

transaction fee rate on 16th April 2009, and lender’s success supply rate ( SSt ) was reduced after the platform’s increase of
lender transaction fee rate on 5th March 2009 to some extent.
During the period between 16th August 2006 and 12th October 2008, Prosper had adjusted the borrower transaction fee and lender
transaction fee three times.We use the same 3SLS model to test the effects of these price adjustments, which are implemented by
adding in three dummy price variables in each equation to represent the four different fee rates. The empirical results are shown
in Table 2.
Table 2: 3SLS estimation results of Prosper (N=786)
Borrower

Total number of lenders ( 1ps )
Total number of borrowers( 1ps )
Borrower fee 1 ( 11ps )
Borrower fee 2 ( 12ps )
Borrower fee 3 ( 13ps )
Total demand amount (  1ps )
Time trend ( 1ps )
R

2

R

2

Lender
Coefficient
7.48e 06

p-value
<.001

 2.00 e  06

<.001
<.001
<.002
.868
<.001
<.001

-0.02
-0.009
0.001
7.15e  09
2.86e  04

0.242
0.235

Coefficient

Total number of borrowers (  2ps )
Total number of lenders (  2ps )
Lender fee 1 ( 21ps )
Lender fee 2 ( 22ps )
Lender fee 3 ( 23ps )
Total demand amount (  2ps )
Time trend (  2ps )
R

2

R

2

p-value
<.100

3.27e  06

2.34e 05

-0.07
-0.003
0.004
6.84e  09

-0.002
0.229
0.222

<.001
<.001
.764
.838
<.050
<.001

The 3SLS model produces insignificant estimates of 13ps , 22ps and 23ps . The coefficients  2ps and  2ps are significant under the
levels of 10% and 5%, respectively. The rest of the coefficients are all estimated to be significant under 1% level. The results
indicate that the last adjustment of borrower fee did not obviously affect the borrower success rate. For the lenders, the last two
adjustments of lender fees did not obviously affect the lender success rate.
Demand-supply relationship
The estimated results of PPDai show negative effect of total demand amount on the success rate of demand amount
pd
pd
(  1  2.48e  08 ), and positive effect of total amount on the success rate of supply amount (  2  1.69e  07 ). However, the value
ps

of two coefficients are both negative for Prosper (  1  7.15e  09 ,  2ps  6.84e  09 ). These results suggest that the increase of
demand amount decreases the success rates of borrower demand on both two platforms, while increases the success rate of
supply on PPDai and decreases the success rate of supply on Prosper. Comparing the two platforms, the relationships between
borrower’s demand and lender’s supply are different. Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics of SDt and SSt .

Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the success rates of demand and supply on PPDai and Prosper
PPDai (N=1,456)
Prosper (N=786)
Mean
Median
Max
Min
Std. Dev.

SDtpd
0.201
0.107
1.000
0.000
0.239

SStpd
0.774
0.952
1.000
0.000
0.347

SDtps
0.073
0.071
0.169
0.001
0.023

SStps
0.556
0.562
0.841
0.023
0.102
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The mean value of SDt of PPDai is 0.201, and that of Prosper is 0.073. On PPDai, a higher ratio of borrower demand could be
satisfied than on Prosper. From the supply aspect, the mean value of SS of PPDai is 0.774, but Prosper’s value is 0.556. The
success rate of supply on PPDai is much higher than on Prosper. The success rates of demand on both two platforms are much
less than the success rates of supply. The amounts of total demand and supply are shown in Fig.4.
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Figure 4: Daily total demand, supply and transaction amounts on PPDai.com and Prosper.com
After several fluctuations, borrower demand amount (DAMT) and lender supply amount (SAMT) on PPDai tends to be equal.
However, on Prosper, Borrower’s demand is much higher than lender’s supply.
The estimate results and the demand-supply relationships in two marketplaces indicate that higher demand of money will lead to
more intensive competition among borrowers, which will in turn reduce the success rate of demand. On Prosper, there are about
89.6% listings failed to fund the loan, and about 44.9% of them are failed because of insufficient supply amount from lenders.
When borrower demand amount is quite larger than the lender supply amount, the supply money is diluted and diversified, and
hence reduce the success rate of supply. Prosper’s success rate of supply could be increased when there is less demand or more
lenders participate into the transactions. On PPDai, the median value of SStpd is 0.952, indicating that a high success rate of
supply. Comparing to the Prosper, the smaller gap between demand amount and supply amount on PPDai, which means the
higher density of supply amount with a higher success rate. Because of the cooperative relationship between borrower and lender,
a higher demand will lead to more supply. This could explain the positive effects of borrower demand on the success rate of
supply.
From the relationships between lender’s supply and borrower’s demand on two platforms, we can conclude that (i) borrowers
always compete with each other on both platforms because of the less supply amount than demand amount, and the success rate
of demand is negatively affected by the total demand; (ii) how the demand amount influences the lenders’ success rate of the
trade is correlated with the demand-supply relationships in the marketplace.
Price sensitivity
Since PPDai was in operation, its pricing strategy has undergone a very slight change. PPDai charges two kinds of transaction
fees, service fee and money transfer fee (including the deposit fee and cash withdrawal fee). Table 4 shows the transfer fees on
PPDai.
Table 4:PPDai’s transaction fees
Borrower
Time

Service fee rate

Money transfer fee
Deposit

2007-06-18

Duration<=6 months: 2%
Duration>6 months: 4%

1%

2009-04-16

Duration<=6 months: 2%
Duration>6 months: 4%

1%

Time

Service fee rate

Money transfer fee
Deposit

2007-06-18

0

1%

2009-03-15

0

1%

Cash withdrawal
<=10,000: 1RMB
<=30,000: 3RMB
>30,000: 6RMB
<=30,000: 3RMB
>30,000: 6RMB

Lender
Cash withdrawal
<=10,000: 1RMB
<=30,000: 3RMB
>30,000: 6RMB
<=30,000: 3RMB
>30,000: 6RMB
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On PPDai, borrower service fee rate is 2% of the loan amount when the duration of the loan is less than or equal to 6 months,
which is increased to 4% when the loan duration is more than 6 months. PPDai has not charged the service fee for lender all the
time, while charged 1% of the loan amount as the deposit fee. Before the date of 15th March 2009, the cash withdrawal fee for all
users was ¥1 when the transfer amount was less than ¥10,000. Right now, the transfer fee for cash withdrawal is set to be ¥3 for
the amount less than ¥30,000, and ¥6 for the amount more than ¥30,000.
Compare to the other two types of fees, the cash withdrawal fee that a borrower must pay to PPDai is relatively less, which means
the increase of the cash withdrawal fee is relatively small to the total fees the borrower pays to the platform. The simultaneous
regression result shows that coefficient 1pd is not statistically significant. It indicates that the success ratio of demand is not
significantly influenced by the change of borrower’s transaction fee rate. On the other hand, without service fee, a lender pays
much less fee to the platform than a borrower has to. The change of the cash withdrawal fee is relatively large to the total fees that
lender pays to the platform. The estimated coefficient of dummy price variable of lender ( 2pd ) is significantly negative. It means
that the increase of transaction fee will decrease the success supply rate ( SStpd ), indicating the lender’s negative price elasticity on
PPDai.
The main transaction fee charged by Prosper is the service fee. Different from PPDai’s strategy of pricing, Prosper had revised
the transaction fee several times for both borrowers and lenders during 5th February 2006 to 12th October 2008, which are shown
in Table 5.
Table 5:Prosper’s transaction fees
Borrower
Time
2006-2-5
2007-2-12
2008-1-4
2008-9-24
Lender
Time
2006-2-5
2007-2-12
2007-10-30
2008-4-15

AA
1%
1%
1%
2%

A
1%
1%
2%
2%

AA
0.5%
0.5%
0.5%
1%

B
1%
1%
2%
2%

C
1%
1%
3%
3%

A
0.5%
0.5%
1%
1%

D
1%
1%
3%
3%

E
1%
2%
3%
3%

B
0.5%
1%
1%
1%

HR
1%
2%
3%
3%
C
0.5%
1%
1%
1%

NC
1%
2%
3%
3%

BMfee_A-NC
25
25
25
75

D
0.5%
1%
1%
1%

E
0.5%
1%
1%
1%

BMfee_AA
25
25
25
75

HR
0.5%
1%
1%
1%

NC
0.5%
1%
1%
1%

BFRate_Rank
1
2
3
4
LFRate_Rank
1
2
3
4

There are eight credit grades (AA, A, B, C, D, E, HR, NC) on Prosper. AA is the highest credit grade, while NC is the lowest. The
transaction fee rates charged by Prosper are different for borrowers (lenders) with different credit grades. Besides, Prosper sets
different minimum fees for borrowers with different credit grades in each transaction, displayed as BMfee_A-NC and
BMfee_AA in Table 5. BFRate_Rank and LFRate_Rank respectively represent the ranks of the borrower and the lender fee rates.
Fig. 5 shows the Prosper’s daily average transaction fee rates paid by borrowers (AVBfrate) and lenders (AVLfrate).
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Figure 5: Daily average transaction fee rates of borrower (AVBfrate) and lender (AVLfrate) on Prosper
The fluctuations of average transaction fee rates on Prosper could explain the significant and insignificant coefficients of the
price dummy variables in the regressions of Prosper. The average transaction fee rate for the borrower was significantly raised
after Prosper’s first and second price adjustments. The regression results also show that borrower’s demand success rate was
significantly lower than before after the platform increasing the borrower fee rate at first and second times. On the other hand, the
average lender transaction fee rate increased a lot after the platform’s first adjustment, while the increase of AVLfrate through last
two price adjustments is not so significant. This could explain why the coefficients of 22ps and 23ps are statistically insignificant in
the estimated regression. The three dummy price variables’ coefficients, 11ps , 12ps and 21ps , are all significantly negative,
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indicating that both the success rates of demand and supply are obviously decreased with the increasing transaction fee rates. The
results also support the user’s negative price elasticity assumption ( i  0 ) in the theoretical part.
Network externalities
The estimated results of PPDai display that there are significant positive inter-group network effects between borrowers and
pd

pd

lenders (   1.11e  04 ,   4.48e  05 ), and significant negative intra-group network effects among borrowers
1

2

pd

( 1  2.91e  05 ) and among lenders ( 2pd  8.12e  05 ) as well. For Prosper, borrowers have positive inter-group network
effects from total number of lenders ( 1ps  7.48e  06 ) and negative intra-group network effects from total number of borrowers
( 1ps  2.00e  06 ). On the other hand, it appears the negative inter-network effects from total number of borrowers to lenders
( 2ps  3.27e  06 ) and positive intra-group network effect among lenders ( 2ps  2.34e  05 ), which is different from the estimated
results of PPDai. The results could be explained by the business model of online P2P lending market, and the demand-supply
relationships of two platforms (as we mentioned in part 4.3).
In online P2P lending market, borrowers usually compete with each other for the lenders, which is called “inside competition” in
online selling market[7]. It exists positive inter-group externalities from lenders to borrowers, and borrowers’ negative
intra-group externalities in both two marketplaces. However, lenders usually do not only compete with each other for borrowers,
but also coordinate with each other by bidding the listing together. The two-sided relationship among lenders means any network
effects could be possible, and this is affected by the demand-supply relationship in the marketplace. On PPDai, the gap between
borrowers’ demand and lenders’ supply is becoming smaller and smaller. Lenders on PPDai have positive inter-group network
externality and negative intra-group network externality. However, on Prosper, larger demand amount than supply amount lead to
many listings failed because of insufficient supply amount. The dilution of lenders’ supply indicates that the funding probability
could be increased to some extent when more lenders participate into transactions, or on the other hand, less demand is requested
by borrowers. This explains the reason why lender has negative inter-group and positive intra-group network externalities.
Platform’s profit- maximizing pricing strategies
In the theoretical model, the platform’s profit-maximizing price is given as i ( j j  ii  f i ). The empirical results show that
1 i
agents in the two marketplaces are sensitive to the platforms’ pricing strategies. The success rates of borrowers’ demand and
lenders’ supply decrease when the price increases, which is consistent to agent’s negative price elasticity (i , i  (1,2) ) assumed in
the theoretical model. Whether platform should charge or subsidize the agent depends on the relationship of agent’s total network
effects (  j j  ii ) and platform’s variable service cost. Suppose the platform’s service cost of agent iis fi ( fi  0 ), platform’s
profit-maximizing pricing strategy for the agent i mainly depends on the agenti’s inter-group network effect to the other group of
agents (  j j ) and the agenti’s intra-group network effect ( ii ).
By using the mean values of the total number of agents in each group and the empirical results, we could calculated the user s’
network effects  j j  ii of the two platforms. The results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Network effects of agents and platform’s profit-maximizing pricing strategies
PPDai
Prosper
Borrower
Lender
Borrower
Lender
Mean value of total user number ( TB, TL )
12,998.24
6,015.682
103,527.4
528,47.23
Inter-group network externality (  j )
7.48e  06
1.11e 04
4.48e 05
 3.27 e  06
Intra-group network externality (  i )
2.00e  06
8.12e  05
2.91e  05
2.34e  05
Total network effect (  j j   ii )
-0.109
0.949
-0.380
2.011
Value of  j j   ii  f i
Unknown
Negative
Unknown
Negative
Pricing strategy

Charge fee

Subsidy: fi  0.949
Charge fee: fi  0.949

Charge fee

Subsidy: fi  2.011
Charge fee: fi  2.011

Both PPDai and Prosper should charge borrower to cover the platforms’ costs, while whether charge or subsidize lender depends
on whether the platform’s variable cost and the lenders’ total network effects. Lenders on Prosper have much stronger network
effects than on PPDai because of the positive intra-group network externality and positive inter-group network externality.
As far as we know, one typical characteristic of electronic commerce is its large population of users, which enables significant
economies of scale [34]. An online platform usually has very low variable costs when it has a large-scale number of users. In the
electronic market, when the user has strong network effects and the platform has a very low variable costs, the platform should
provide the service for free or even subsidize the users. For example, in China, Taobao charges no fee from buyers and sellers;
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Amazon and Dangdang usually have sales promotions; 360buy sells products with low prices to attract buyers. As a new form of
electronic commerce, online P2P lending market has attracted a large number of users. Taking PPDai and Prosper for instance,
PPDai has about 40,000 active users on 15th June 2011, while Prosper has about 280,000 active users on 12th October 2008. So,
the platform should subsidize lenders to maximize the profits when the average variable costs are small enough. Comparing to
PPDai, Prosper has a larger number of users as well as stronger positive network effects of lenders, which suggests that it is more
likely setting a lower lender fee for Prosper. However, the truth is that PPDai only charges lenders low money transfer fees and
Prosper charges a high average lender fee rate. Finally, PPDai’s supply amount tends to be at the same level of the demand
amount, while Prosper’s demand amount is much higher than the supply amount. Based on these analysis, we conclude that
Prosper had a higher lender fee rates above the optimal level.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
Using the daily transaction data of PPDai.com and Prosper.com, this study analyzes the characteristics of online P2P lending
marketplaces. We find that it exits positive inter-group network effects between borrowers and lenders, and negative intra-group
network effects among borrowers and among lenders on PPDai. On Prosper, borrowers have positive inter-group network effects
from the lenders and negative intra-group network effects, while lenders have positive intra-group network effects and negative
inter-group network effects. The unsuccessful rate of listings on Prosper is high because of the less supply than demand, and the
success rate of supply could be increased when more lenders bid the listings or less demand is required by borrowers. The
empirical results show that the users’ network externalities are influenced by the demand-supply relationships in the online
marketplaces, which is different from the conclusions of previous literature of electronic market [i.e., 3, 18, 26]. The literature of
online marketplace usually discusses the market with the characteristics of two groups of agents – the buyers and the sellers. In
this kind of market, the participation of one group raises the value of participating for the other group, while the participation
within the group reduces the value of participating because of the competition. So, in much of the literature, positive inter-group
network effects and negative intra-group effects are modeled and analyzed [i.e., 3, 7]. However, the business model of online P2P
lending leads to two-sided relationships (competing and coordinating) among lenders, which means any network effects of
lenders could be possible. The empirical findings of online P2P lending suggest that as agents in the same group have intensive
competition, it probably exists negative intra-group network externality. Besides, it will exist positive intra-group network
externality if the agents in the same group collaborate rather than compete with each other in the transactions. Due to the diverse
of electronic market, a wider variety of e-business initiatives [9], and any kinds of network effects are also possible, which
present unique challenges as well as chances in the modeling and analysis.
About how the agents react to the prices in the context of P2P lending, the estimated results show that the success rates of demand
and supply on both platforms will be reduced when the transact fees for two-sided users set by platform are significantly
increased, which implies the negative price elasticity. Based on the theoretical model and estimated results, we analyze the
platforms’ profit-maximizing pricing strategies for borrowers and lenders with several findings. We suggest that both PPDai and
Prosper subsidize the lenders and recover the loss on the borrowers. The Platforms should charge fees for borrowers all the time,
but whether charge positive fees for lenders or not depends on the relationship between the lenders’ total network effects and
platform’s variable cost. Consistent with the empirical results of platforms’ pricing strategies in this study, both PPDai and
Prosper set much higher transaction fees for borrowers than the fees for lenders, respectively. Comparing the two platforms,
lenders on Prosper have a much higher positive network effects than on PPDai, and Prosper has much larger users population
than PPDai. Theoretically, Prosper is more likely to set a lower lender transaction fee. However, Prosper set a much higher lender
transaction fee than PPDai. This might be the reason why Prosper has a relatively larger demand than supply, while the demand
and supply on PPDai tends to be equal along the time.
By applying the theory of two-sided market to the online P2P lending marketplaces, the study enhancing our understanding of the
characteristics of the two-sided electronic marketplaces, which could be shed light on the platforms’ pricing strategies. Moreover,
the empirical findings also point out theinsufficient works done by previous research, which are the theoretical contributions of
this paper. However, we think that some further works are still needed in our future research. As a new type of market, online P2P
lending marketplaces do not have intense competition between them because they usually adopt different business models, which
is the support of the monopoly model in this study. However, as far as we know, the platforms’ business models are becoming
more and more similar to each other with the development of the market. For example, with a decade development, the main
electronic commerce platforms in the same field (C2C, B2C and B2B) usually have quite similar operation modes with each
other nowadays. Prosper transferred the mode of operation to the LendingClub’s this year. This study does not include the
competition in the model, which might limit our research outcomes to be applied to future analysis of online P2P lending and
other electronic markets. Second, due to the limitation of platforms’ cost data, we could not evaluate the platforms’
profit-maximizing pricing strategies for lenders and give the profit-maximizing price levels for borrowers and lenders. Third,
users’ network effects on platform’s price may vary with the development of the platform as Lin et al. [15] assumed that
increasing network size may have complex effects on the innovation incentives in the platform market. We observe that the
network externalities is related to the demand-supply relationships in the marketplaces, and how to qualify the relationships is
also the one direction of our future works. Given to the limitations of this study, we treat our results as illustrative. However, the
limitations offer opportunities for future work, and this research will try to do further research by solving these problems.
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